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According to many of the students I teach, the really
important aspect of literary works is a mysterious entity called
"the hidden meaning" Â—the central purpose of novels and
poems, the ideas their writers were intending to communicate
to us. Describing those ideas as "hidden" implies a bewildering
paradox: that which writers want us to understand is the
one thing they never actually say. If the meaning of a literary
text is properly hidden, then the work might well mean
almost anything Â— anything but what its words literally say. A
poem which seems to be describing a bird in flight may be
about God or death or love or war or the pain of adolescence,
or it may be about some peculiar combination of all of them;
the one certain fact is that it is not about a bird.
Many of my students think of meanings as being hidden
simply because they haven't easily seen the ones that have
been apparent to their teachers; what is actually hidden from
them is not the meaning itself, but a clear explanation of how
that meaning connects to and emerges from the words that
signify it. The ability to provide such explanations is the
essence of good communication; knowing they do in fact exist
ought to persuade us of the fact that, given our knowledge of
appropriate contexts for them, the meanings of literature are
not hidden; texts do mean just what they say.
But then, of course, different contexts evoke different
meanings from the same words. In different circumstances, the
word "blue" can evoke the happiness of a cloudless day or the
melancholy of a gloomy mood, and so the meanings that words
are in fact able to convey in a surprisingly exact fashion may
nevertheless seem different to some of us than they do to
others. Because we have no choice but to understand language
in terms of our own previous knowledge, meanings that may
seem literal to some of us might well be hidden to others. And
for that reason, there is a sense in which my students are not
wrong to conceive of meanings as hidden.
Indeed, whether we are students or teachers or writers of
criticism in academic journals like this one, we all tend to act as
if meanings are, in an important sense, hidden. The mere fact
of literary criticism, writing that purports to discuss the meaning
and significance of other writing, presupposes that literature
itself does not communicate clearly or successfully. That we
need to provide our own words in order to tell other people
what a poet's or novelist's words have communicated implies
that the original words of the poem or novel have not clearly
communicated what we understood them to say. Indeed, we
tend to assume that our basic response to a work of literature
should be an act of interpretation Â—that is, an attempt to see
beyond the specific words we read to the meanings hidden
within them. Like my students, even professional interpreters
act as if the important meanings engendered by works of
literature are the one thing that the words of texts themselves
never say.
Detailed discussion of specific works of literature with the
main purpose of describing their significant meanings has
been a central aspect of literary study only in this century Â—it
certainly wasn't a practice of critics like Dr. Johnson or Coleridge.
But if Jacques Derrida is right, the idea that the significant
meanings of written texts exist somewhere separate from the
written words themselves is a basic concept of Western
civilization.
In Of Grammatology, Derrida explores the ways in which our
concepts of language depend on and imply the idea that
writing itself is merely a poor container, a distorted representa-
tion both of reality and of thoughts about it. His basic purpose
is to show that, if we logically explore what we know about the
operations of language, we must reach the conclusion that all
communication, indeed all thought, all consciousness, is a form
of writing. We could not think or speak if we did not already
have a system of signifiers related to each other structurally by
their differences from each other, so writing as we usually
understand itÂ—visual symbols for sounds Â—is merely one specific
form of that system of differences Â— and it is that system which
Derrida identifies as writing. If all consciousness is writing,
furthermore, then there is no consciousness of anything outside
writing: "There is nothing outside of the text" (158). We may
perhaps perceive what we identify as physical presences; but
the instant we identify those presences as "a desk" or "the color
red" or "cold" they become part of writing. Even the act of
perception, of singling out objects as separate and therefore
different from their backgrounds, is an act of writing.
According to Derrida, we disguise that from ourselves because
of our conviction that writing is limited Â—that the fragmented
ways in which it speaks are distortions of a truer and more
integrated reality outside it. Logically speaking, that conviction
is a deception. Linguistics has conventionally assumed that
language consists of signifiers Â— specific sounds or markings
that stand for something else, something signified. Derrida
shows that each signified is itself a signifier of something
elseÂ—just as the significance of each of the words in the
dictionary is explained by other words, each of which is itself
defined elsewhere in the dictionary, so that finally the meaning
of each of the words depends on the existence of all of the
others, and none of the words refers to anything except other
words. Since each signified is itself a signifier, the system
neither requires nor allows any insight into a world of concepts
or objects or beings signified outside itself. As a result, to use
Derrida's phrase, there is no "transcendental signified" Â—
nothing which transcends language and is centrally and most
significantly real.
According to Derrida, western thought is based on the
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supposition of the transcendental signified that he challenges.
It places a possibly real world, which is actually outside and
beyond the purview of language and therefore not available to
consciousness, at the center of language, inside of it, and sees its
central truths as being hidden or veiled by language. Thus,
physical reality, ideas, even God, are quite literally hidden
meanings, the truths held by and distorted by the superficial
inaccuracies of writing. Derrida's intention in pointing out the
primacy of writing is to challenge the possibility of a transcend-
ental signified in a way that might shift our understanding
both of reality and of written texts. He severely undermines the
idea that texts themselves contain a "transcendental signified,"
a hidden meaning that can be unveiled through the operations
of an interpreter, and he forces us to become conscious of two
important facts about them. The first is their inevitable
connection with and dependence on other writing, their
intertextuality. The second is their focus on the ways in which
intertextuality prevents texts from achieving a separate whole-
ness or unity; because signifiers always imply and evoke all the
things they are different from, texts always imply and evoke all
the things they do not say.
Most specifically, as a large body of deconstructionist criticism
has revealed, they undermine their own apparent meanings
and intentions. As Jonathan Culler points out, it's ironic that a
theory which set out to subvert the assumptions underlying
acts of interpretation has itself been made into a version of
interpretation. As it happens, that version of interpretation
doesn't seem to be of particular value as a way of reading
children's litrature, simply because it's so easily done. As
sophisticated experts reading a literature intended for an
audience of inexperienced youngsters, most adults easily see
beyond the apparent completeness of works of children's
literature, easily see the ways in which these works deceptively
manufacture a false view of an unconvincing world, easily find
in these works what deconstructionists call "aporias" Â—those
moments at which texts unravel and tend to imply the opposite
of what they claim to be saying.
Deconstruction is not, however, an act of destruction. In
seeing the degree to which the worlds constructed by literature
are artificial, we can surely develop a deeper appreciation of
their artifice. What more of us need to do is to deconstruct our
assumption that children themselves should not be given the
tools to see the artifice of these works, that it is somehow good
for children to be innocent, that is, to believe in the transcend-
ental signified of these clearly limited visions of reality. Derrida
himself provides us with a way of surfacing and exploring such
assumptions in O/ Grammatology, in his discussion of how
Rousseau developed an idea of childhood that paradoxically
seems to privilege children by making them less than adults,
more "natural" and therefore less human.
Derrida's ideas can be particularly useful for scholars of
children's literature simply because they force us to consider all
of our assumptionsÂ—not least of which are our assumptions
about interpretation. As a number of recent books reveal,
the ways in which we discuss fairy tales are particularly
illuminated when viewed from the perspective provided by
O/ Grammatology.
The Outside is the Inside
Fairy tales are almost too obvious an example of what
Derrida calls "the effacement of the signifier" (20) Â—the way
our distrust of the words we read causes us to see them as mere
containers of something more important, to the point of
making the words themselves disappear from our consciousness.
In one way or another, almost everyone who discusses fairy
tales disappears the tales themselves, the signifiers, and assumes
that their real significance, the core of their inner truth, is
something which in actual fact lies outside of them.
As we all know, fairy tales are written versions of stories once
told orally. For folklorists, the most significant fact about such
stories is that they can be told in many different ways. As A.K.
Ramanujan says, "worldwide types, forms and motifs are
reworked by a local (illiterate) teller into an uniquely patterned
story. Both the pattern and motifs are seen as signifiers. Though
the typical structures are common, the realized tale means
different things in different cultures, times, and media" (260).
Thus, stories are not only told differently, their meanings vary
significantly from version to version. We can explore details of
individual stories to develop an understanding of them; but we
cannot expect to find any deep inner truths at the core of them.
Individual tales have meanings; while tale types have the
potential for many different meanings, it seems unlikely that
they have any particular one of their own.
We can see that even by exploring the history of the written
versions of a widely popular tale like "Little Red Riding Hood."
Charles Perrault told it as a moral parable about the dangers
of children not knowing enough, of being ignorant of the evil at
large in the world: children foolish enough to talk to wolves
get what they deserve. But the Grimm brothers told it as a
parable about the inevitability of the ignorance of children, who
need, not to learn of evil, but to accept their elders' wise counsel
as protection against it. In these two version, in other words,
the story has the exact opposite meaning. As with all tales of
this sort, the basic structure is capable of becoming many dif-
ferent tales with many different meanings; and those meanings
are capable of many different interpretations.
That provides folklorists with an intriguingly paradoxical
stance towards interpretation. In an article in Cinderella-. A
Casebook, Alan Dundes uses his knowledge of folk stories of
the Cinderella type to present a psychoanalytical interpretation
of Shakespeare's King Lear; but after energetically arguing for
the validity of his own interpretation, he insists that it is merely
another version, in effect his own retelling of the story of King
Lear. In a final footnote he says, "It cannot be stressed too
strongly that a psychoanalytical reading of King Lear is my own
interpretation of a play which has inspired dozens. Too often
psychoanalytic critics give the impression that they believe
their reading is the reading rather than a meaning of a literary
text. The folkloristic and psychoanalytic perspectives utilized in
this essay do not pretend to explicate all facts of the play" (244).
For Dundes, the core of meaning he finds on the inside of the
play is still acknowledged to be on the outsideÂ—he does not
confuse his inner Lear with the inner Lear.
While other commentators would seem to agree with this
eclectic position, the agreement is only apparent. Referring in
Grimm's Bad Girls and Bold Boys to Max LÃ¼thi's idea that fairy
tales "typically appear before us sublimated and emptied of
meaning," Ruth Bottigheimer says, "This condition makes
them susceptible to 'filling' and coloring by interpreters in
Christian, psychological, nationalist, feminist, Marxist, or
anthropological hues," and claims "to avoid this as far as
possible" (167)Â· But apparently it isn't all that possible. Despite
the objectivity Bottigheimer claims for her "content analysis"
approach to the tales, she nevertheless discovers a "latent
content" which she herself believes to be the truth inside the
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tales and which suspiciously mirrors her own late twentieth-
century values: a positive view of female power and potential
which she claims to find underlying what she sees as the
repressive nineteenth-century attitudes imposed on the tales
by the Grimm brothers. Bottigheimer herself admits that she
has "not excluded an interpretive component" (x), and justifies
doing so in language that intriguingly duplicates the imagery of
"filling": to avoid doing so, she says, would leave her with
"empty bits of information" (x).
Joyce Thomas also insists that all interpretations are limited,
that "all such intellectual, theoretical translations Â— always
interesting, frequently illuminatingÂ—can, however, never replace
the tale's own, most eloquent voice. That the humble Volks-
mÃ¤rchen should speak so many and such divergent responses
suggests something of their eternal mystery and appeal. Despite
all tamperings and interpretations, the tales survive. . . " ( 105).
While this seems to agree with Dundes, it actually implies the
opposite Â—not that all interpretations are equally possible, but
that all pale in the light of the truth of the tale itself. Derrida
would not be surprised that Thomas refers to that true thing
outside or beyond the reach of written interpretations as a
"voice," as speech rather than writing: the keystone of the
"logocentric" ideology he attacks is the idea that writing is but a
pale imitation of speech. Furthermore, the failure of interpre-
tation does not prevent Thomas herself from providing one,
one that is clearly a hidden meaning, an idea of her own from
the outside that she discovers on the inside. She identifies the
truth of the tales as the Truth hidden within reality itself, "the
unfamiliar asleep within the familiar, the magical hosed within
the shell of the mundane. . . .This is the world, the tales say,
and it is truly marvellous, mysterious, wonder-full" (115). For
Thomas, not only do the actual words of the tale become a
deceptive shell, that shell itself then becomes a metaphor of
our usual conceptions of reality. The world we usually perceive
is but a symbol of something deeper, a signifier expressing and
effaced by a deeper truth.
Bruno Bettelheim doesn't even pretend to believe that the
tales can be interpreted differently. For him, they express one
clear truth. The fact that they emerge from an anonymous oral
tradition prior to writing and to the expression of self that
writing inevitably implies means that they can express something
beyond the limited perceptions of any individual writer: because
they were created in a variety of minds, they deal with
"universal human problems" (6). As a neo-Freudian, Bettelheim
defines such problems in psychoanalytic terms; and so, as
Derrida might have predicted, he makes the outside the inside.
He finds his own psychoanalytic theory on the inside of the
tales, the central core that underlines them and makes them
meaningful: "The fairy story communicates to the child an
intuitive, subconscious understanding of his own nature and of
what his future may hold if he develops his positive potentials
.... as symbols of psychological happenings or problems,
these stories are quite true" (155). That means, of course, that
they become true only by becoming "symbols" of something
else, exteriors significant only because they signify a hidden
interior. In making stories expressive of a hidden truth,
Bettelheim effaces their signifiers and ignores the particularity
of their surface.
Above all, he ignores the fact that the particular tales he
discusses are not actually products of the general unconscious.
Bettelheim assumes that the Grimm versions are authentic
representations of the oral tradition; other commentators quite
rightly identify the meanings of these versions with the Grimms'
own time and place. Bottigheimer expresses annoyance that
"until recently most nonscholarly and some scholarly Western
European and American interpretations of Grimms' Tales shared
one basic premise, sometimes expressed, but usually assumed:
namely, that fairy tales exist independently of the variables
introduced by individual narrators" (15); instead, she insists
that "both in plot and vocabulary this volume [the Grimm
collection of 1812] reflects early nineteenth-century Central
German bourgeois experiences and values" (4). In a more
paranoid vein, John Ellis tries to show that the Grimms
themselves deliberately fostered the misconception that their
tales accurately represented the oral tradition, but that they
actually made many changes, and that they "simply could not
avoid changing the substance of the stories as well as their
verbal fabric in tampering with them to so great an extent"
(53). And in Fairy Tales and the Art of Subversion, Jack Zipes says
that "the fairy tales we have come to revere as classical are not
ageless, universal, and beautiful in and of themselves. . . .They
are historical prescriptions, internalized, potent, explosive, and
we acknowledge the power they hold over our lives by
mystifying them" (11).
Yet despite this insistence that these versions represent local
values, these commentators also imply the existence of another
tale, now hidden inside the corruptions of a retelling, that does
speak deeper and more universal truths. I suggested earlier
that Bottigheimer sees evidence of "a latent belief in the
natural powers of women" (5), a more positive and more
healthy, i.e., truer meaning still present underneath the
bourgeois ideology that ascribed limited power to women
which the Grimms imposed on the tales. Ellis insists that "the
Grimms' attempts to make the motivation of the tales clearer
simply results in their narrowing down the possible range of
explanations or motives..." (59) so that the tales become less
evocative, i.e., less true: "the mysterious, magical and often
threatening world of these tales is tamed and made more
rational, predictable, and benevolent" (70). After getting angry
at those who mystify the tales, Zipes then "mystifies" them
himself by insisting that the "historical prescriptions" of
bourgeois writers like Perrault and the Grimms are distortions
of a saner, i.e., truer, folk tradition; in Breaking the Magical Spell,
for instance, he speaks of "the imaginative motifs and symbolical
elements of class conflict and rebellion in the pre-capitalist folk
tales" (24).
These commentators deconstruct their own arguments: yes,
the versions of the tales we know express the culture of a
specific time and place; and yes, these versions also express (or
hide under their distortions, but in a way that these critics
themselves can interpret and unveil) a truer tale. This truer tale
can be read even though it cannot be read.
This sort of contradiction is particularly apparent in what is
certainly the most stimulating and persuasive of recent works
on fairy tales, Maria Tatar's The Hard Facts of the Grimms' Fairy
Tales. Like Ellis, Bottigheimer and Zipes, Tatar convincingly
repudiates the idea that the Grimm tales express eternal
verities: "Wilhelm Grimm felt obliged to stamp the tales' actors
with his own character judgements and thus shaped his
readers' view of them" (30). Yet she also insists that the tales
she discusses, translations of the same Grimm versions that
reveal Wilhelm's prejudices, "offer collective truths, realities
that transcend individual experience and that have stood the
test of time" (xv-xvi). For Tatar, the tales are clearly deceptive
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signifiers masking a truer inside: "Beneath all the variations in
its verbal realization the basic form still shines through" (xvii).
Tatar expresses deep scorn about "the ways in which critics
strain to find messages appropriate to children" (164) in fairy
tales; since I am myself one of the critics she specifically
expresses scorn for, I'm delighted to report that she herself
quite baldly states what many of the other commentators
discussed here pretend to deny, "to search for the hidden
meaning of the Grimms' fairy tales," she says, "is therefore not
so fatuous an exercise as some would have us believe" (38).
Nor, despite her scorn for the "sophistry" of critics like me, does
she herself hesitate to search; a few pages after complaining
about my statement that "The Golden Bird" is "a profound
praise of placidity," she herself "strains to find messages
appropriate to children" as she insists that "Bluebeard" "displays
a special capacity to magnify and dramatize the most profoundly
disturbing facts and fantasies of a child's mental world" (169). I
suspect my own view of "The Golden Bird" has more in
common with Tatar's persuasive reading of the structural
oddities of fairy tales than with this unpersuasive assertion that
the tales express concerns of particular relevance to children.
But just as Bottigheimer finds her own faith in female power
and Zipes his own Marxist philosophy inside the tales, Tatar
finds her own interests there also. Her stimulating and highly
evocative readings combine elements from psychoanalysis,
structuralism, and folklore in a highly rewarding way, and I
strongly recommend them. But even while I do so, I have to
add the obvious fact that they are persuasive because they are
highly individual, in a way which suggests that the inner truth
of fairy tales, as is usually the case in interpretation, is actually
the essence of the interpreter's view of life.
There are three possible reasons that I find Tatar's interpre-
tations so persuasive. The first is that her own individual view
of life and way of reading literature are similar to my own. The
second is that the tales I am most familiar with are the same
versions by the Grimms in which Tatar actually does find the
meanings that she claims are central to all fairy tales and
therefore separate from the ideological impositions of the
Grimms. Both of these seem possible, although they would
imply a far more local significance to both the meanings of the
tales and to her interpretations of them than Tatar herself
might wish. More important, both are far more possible than
the third possibility Â— that what Tatar exports from the exterior
actually is resident within and beneath the surface of the
tales themselves.
The Priority of What's Prior
The various commentators I've discussed all believe that the
truths they find inside folk tales are there because the tales
existed in the oral tradition prior to their written versions. They
therefore share the quality of essential truth that we assume to
be the essence of God's own voice speaking: "In the beginning
was the Word." Earlier I misrepresented Derrida by quoting
him out of context: he spoke not just of "the effacement of the
signifier" but specifically of "the effacement of the signifier in
the voice" (2). We are convinced that the spoken word is truer
than the written word because it is closer to the source Â—prior
to writing. As Derrida says, "Thus, within this epoch, reading
and writing, the production or interpretation of signs, the text
in general as fabric of signs, allow themselves to be confined
within secondariness. They are preceded by a truth, or a
meaning already constituted by and within the element of the
logos" (14). Being oral, the oral tales represent not only
something outside of writing, and therefore less distorted, truer
than the distorted versions recorded in writing by Perrault or
the Grimms, but also, something prior to writing, and thus
purer, closer to a less socialized and therefore superior essence.
Bettelheim sees the oral tales as expressive of an unconscious
that not only underlies but precedes the development of
individual egos, Zipes as expressive of a pre-literate, pre-
bourgeois vision of communality that precedes the celebration
of individual integrity and power found in later written versions.
For Thomas and Tatar and Bottigheimer, similarly, oral tales
speak whatever each of them sees as truth because they
precede the distorted special pleading of later written versions
and interpretations.
The insistence that prior is truer is so basic a characteristic of
our thought that these commentators often feel the need to
invent history in order to support their points of view. Most
obviously, all of them have actually invented the theoretically
purer oral tales they unearth from the bowels of the Perrault
and Grimm versions; they are free to imagine whatever they
want of such "authentic" oral versions, simply because such
version are by definition unrecorded and therefore unknown
to history.
More specifically, Bettelheim insists that even though the
Grimm's version of "Little Red Riding Hood" was published
more than a century after Perrault 's it is nevertheless the one
that best represents the true folk tradition Â— it must be prior, for
it is more expressive of the deep truths he wants to find hidden
within the tale. Whereas the Grimm version "externalizes the
inner processes of the pubertal child" (177), "Perrault wanted
not only to entertain his audience, but to teach a specific moral
lesson with each of his tales. So it is understandable that he
changed them accordingly. Unfortunately, in doing so, he
robbed his fairy stories of much of their meaning" (168).
Similarly, Zipes, who wants to show in The Triais and TribuLÂ·tions
of Little Red Riding Hood that both Perrault and Grimm distort
the more positive values of an earlier peasant tradition, insists
that a tale containing elements he approves of and which was
not recorded until 1885 actually represents the oral tradition
prior to Perrault's telling in 1697. By the time Zipes writes "A
Second Gaze at Little Red Riding Hood's Trials and Tribula-
tions," he blithely reprints the 1885 tale as "the oral tale as it
was probably disseminated in the French countryside during
the late Middle Ages before Perrault refined and polished it"
(228); an accompanying footnote refers readers only to Zipes's
own earlier discussion, and doesn't mention the 1885 origin of
this supposedly medieval version.
A little less deceptively, both Ellis and Tatar assume that
versions of the tales which the Grimms sent to Clemens
Brentano prior to publication of the first edition of their tales in
1812 represent more accurately than anything else what they
had originally heard from, their informants. Tatar calls these
"the original drafts" (8), and Ellis says that "the extent of the
differences is sufficient to give a clear idea of the nature of the
changes made by the brothers, regardless of any they may have
made before passing the manuscripts to Brentano" (38). The
extreme brevity of these versions might well suggest that they
are merely synopses; since Brentano had asked for story ideas,
there was no reason for the Grimms to send him complete
tales. But these versions are sparse enough to support the idea
that the Grimms added immensely to the tales, so once again,
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prior becomes truer. Ellis and Tatar both support their
arguments by focusing on the way Wilhelm Grimm changed
the tales from edition to edition; neither considers the surely
very real possibility that the changes might represent different
versions of the tale that he may have heard or been told of in
the meantime, and it's hard to believe that he himself actually
invented details such as the stepsisters cutting off their toes and
heels in Cinderella, as Ellis seems to suggest.
While Bottigheimer is a little less obvious in her priorizations,
she does imply that tales containing powerful women represent
earlier and truer versions. She says of three similar tales about
many brothers and one sister, "Their narrative similarity
notwithstanding, the three tales differ in that they progressively
weaken the figure of the sister. . . The many modifications of
the figure of the independent princess as she appears in "The
Twelve Brothers" result in the personally ineffectual little sister
in "The Six Swans" (37, 39). In three other tales, furthermore,
"the power of the [female] conjurer. . . appears in progressively
attenuated form" (45). Bottigheimer presents no factual evidence
to suggest that the "weakened" or "attenuated" tales come later
in time than the stronger ones; she cleverly suggests priority
without actually making any case for it.
Deconstruction and Children
In demonstrating how all these commentators play the game
of disappearing the signifier, Derrida's insights reveal not only
the extent to which the claims they make for their interpretations
are invalid, but also, curiously, just where the positive value of
their interpretations might actually reside. Joyce Thomas
expresses a common attitude of children's literature specialists
when she dismisses all interpretations as "cacophonous babble"
that inevitably misrepresents the tales' "own, most eloquent
voice" (105); Derrida's deconstructionist approach suggests
that they probably have no such voice, that what Thomas
identifies as that voice is just another part of the babble, and
that the "babble" is as much truth as human beings can hope to
hear. As folkloristic research reveals to us, there is no such
thing as an "authentic" folk tale. AU tales are merely versions,
all versions are equal to each other if not in value then at least
in authenticity; and in a very real sense, then, the interpretations
provided by commentators are also merely versions, new ways
of telling the same old story. Bettelheim's complex Freudian
analyses hardly express the real truth of the tales; but for
anyone pleased by the elegant logic of Freudian thought, they
are extraordinarily powerful stories in their own right, versions
as delightful and thought-provoking as those by Grimm.
And if interpretations are merely new versions, it is only
because all versions are merely interpretations. We too often
use our conviction of the authenticity of the Grimm versions as
a weapon to attack the inadequacies of versions we like less; we
say that the trouble with the Disney movie versions or with
supermarket pop-up versions is their inauthenticity, their
distance from oral sources. Bettelheim, for instance, insists that
"the true meaning and impact of a fairy tale can be appreciated,
its enchantment can be experienced, only from the story in its
original form" ( 19). Once we realized that there is no original
form, no form with priority, then we must learn to be more
honest, and to attack versions we dislike on more legitimate
grounds: our lack of agreement with the values they consciously
or unconsciously espouse and express. Disney fails to the
degree to which he successfully and authentically conveys
contemporary mainstream North-American values, not the
degree to which he varies from a presumed authentic original.
Our faith in the authenticity of such originals has yet wider
implications. Derrida says, "Man caÃ-Ã-s himself man only by
drawing limits excluding his other... : the purity of nature, of
animality, primitivism, childhood, madness, divinity" (244).
Derrida suggests that this is a dangerously self-abusing
privileging of the prior and more primitive by those who see
themselves as coming after and thus, degenerated from, a state
of innocence. Specialists in children's literature often view
childhood as this sort of "other." Our common clichÃ©s about
the ways in which children are close to nature or to God, about
how their ignorance is really a saving innocence, disguise a
profound distrust for the realities of life as we must view it as
adults Â— and perhaps most significantly, a nostalgia for that
which never was. For as Derrida shows, there never was an
"other" Â— never anything before writing, never a prior, truer
mode of speaking or thinking except the ones we invent as a
means of belittling our adult selves; and similarly, there surely
never was a childhood, in the sense of something surer and
safer and happier than the world we perceive as adults. In
privileging childhood as this sort of "other," we misrepresent
and belittle what we are; more significantly, we belittle childhood
and allow ourselves to ignore our actual knowledge of real
children. For while all that we see as "other" may appear to be
privileged, it is so only at the expense of becoming inhuman,
marginalized, actually insignificant. To express nostalgia for a
childhood we no longer share is to deny the actual significance
and humanity of children.
If children are different from adults, it's not because they are
wiser, but merely because they are less experienced. Our
obligation is not to deprive them of our knowledge in the faith
that their ignorance represents a wonderful otherness, a priority,
a closeness to truth and nature and even God. It is to allow
them to know as much as possible about the only reality that
actually matters Â—the world that they share with us.
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